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Approximating the equilibrium quantity traded and
welfare in large markets
Ellen V. Muir∗ and Konstantin Borovkov†
Abstract
We consider the efficient outcome of a canonical economic market model in-
volving buyers and sellers with independent and identically distributed random
valuations and costs, respectively. When the number of buyers and sellers is large,
we show that the joint distribution of the equilibrium quantity traded and welfare
is asymptotically normal. Moreover, we bound the approximation rate. The proof
proceeds by constructing, on a common probability space, a representation con-
sisting of two independent empirical quantile processes, which in large markets can
be approximated by independent Brownian bridges. The distribution of interest
can then be approximated by that of a functional of a Gaussian process. This
methodology applies to a variety of mechanism design problems.
Keywords: Efficient market outcome, large markets, Bayesian mechanism design,
empirical quantile processes, Brownian bridges
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1 Introduction and main results
The problem of how to achieve efficient market outcomes has been of fundamental im-
portance in economics, dating back to the pioneering work of Le´on Walras. A significant
and sometimes insurmountable barrier to designing efficient markets is the information
required to set prices that equate market demand and supply. In many practical ap-
plications this information is privately held by strategic buyers and sellers (agents) who
will not freely reveal this information, given the impact this will have on market prices.
For a market intermediary (such as a stock exchange) to elicit this information and im-
plement the efficient outcome, agents with private information must be appropriately
compensated. Thus, in many cases it is not possible to design a market which is efficient,
∗The corresponding author. School of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of Melbourne,
Parkville VIC 3010, Australia; e-mail: evmuir@unimelb.edu.au.
†School of Mathematics and Statistics, The University of Melbourne, Parkville VIC 3010, Australia;
e-mail: borovkov@unimelb.edu.au.
1
Approximating welfare in large efficient markets
correctly elicits private information from agents (formally, is incentive compatible and
individually rational) and does not require an intermediary to subsidise trade (formally,
is deficit-free). In the field of mechanism design, this result is known as the impossibility
of efficient trade and was first emphasised by Myerson and Satterthwaite [22].
Mechanism design provides an important and influential approach to dealing with
market design problems involving private information, with applications ranging from
the allocation of government resources (including land, mining rights, radio spectrum
licenses and university places) to kidney exchange programs and advertisement placement
in Internet search engines (see Loertscher, Marx and Wilkening [15] for a recent survey).
In the Bayesian mechanism design literature the private information of a given buyer or
seller is modelled as a random variable, whose realisation is known only to that buyer or
seller. All other buyers and sellers and the market intermediary know only the distribution
of this random variable. The role of the intermediary is to choose the market mechanism.
A mechanism determines, as a function of the private information revealed by agents, the
identity of trading agents and the prices they pay and receive. In light of the Myerson–
Satterthwaite impossibility theorem, a prominent strand of mechanism design literature
focuses on designing markets that are efficient, incentive compatible, individually rational
and deficit-free asymptotically, as the number of buyers and sellers grows large (see, for
example, McAfee [18] and Rustichini, Satterthwaite and Williams [25]). This requires
approximating mechanism outcomes (such as the equilibrium quantity traded and welfare)
in large markets.
In this paper we consider the canonical mechanism design market model, known as the
independent private values model. We devise a general methodology for approximating
mechanism outcomes in large markets under the independent private values assumption.
To do this, we restrict attention to approximating the equilibrium quantity traded and
welfare under the efficient mechanism (which, of course, is not necessarily deficit-free).
We show that, as both the number of buyers and number of sellers tend to infinity, the
joint distribution of the equilibrium quantity traded and welfare is asymptotically normal,
and give an upper bound for the approximation rate. This is accomplished by construct-
ing, on a common probability space, an empirical quantile process representing market
demand and an independent empirical quantile process representing supply together with
two independent and appropriately weighted Brownian bridges approximating the above-
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mentioned quantile processes. The distribution of interest can then be approximated by
that of a functional of a Gaussian process.
Several papers analyse the performance of mechanisms in large markets with indepen-
dent private values, including Gresik and Satterthwaite [10], McAfee [18], Satterthwaite
and Williams [24] and Rustichini, Satterthwaite and Williams [25]. However, this lit-
erature has previously focused on computing the rate at which mechanism outcomes
converge to efficiency. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to compute
higher order distributional approximations (of the central limit theorem-type) to mecha-
nism outcomes. One advantage of this approach is that it enables the direct comparison
of different mechanisms using the parameters of the approximating normal distributions.
Furthermore, our approach immediately generalises to any mechanism which can be ap-
propriately represented in terms of transformed empirical quantile functions, which covers
a large class of mechanisms studied in the Bayesian mechanism design literature, as is
discussed in detail in Section 2. The common probability space method also allows us
to compute the covariance of mechanism outcomes, which is problematic if a rate of
convergence approach is adopted and is important in some settings (see, for example,
p. 447 of McAfee [18]). Finally, unlike papers (such as Gresik and Satterthwaite [10])
which consider sequences of markets with a fixed ratio of buyers and sellers, we formulate
more general convergence results that apply to nets of markets in which this ratio is not
necessarily fixed.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We now introduce the indepen-
dent private values model, describe the problem of interest and state our main results.
In Section 2, we discuss extensions and applications of these results. Proofs are included
in Section 3.
We consider a market in which units of a homogeneous, indivisible good are traded
among N buyers {i1, . . . , iN} and M sellers {j1, . . . , jM}. Each buyer is interested in
purchasing one unit of the good, and each seller has the capacity to produce and sell one
unit of the good. Buyers are willing to purchase the good at a price not exceeding their
respective private reservation valuations V1, . . . , VN that are assumed to be independent
and identically distributed random variables with a common distribution function F
with support [a, b]. Sellers are willing to produce at a price that is not less than their
respective private production costs C1, . . . , CM , which are also assumed to be independent
3
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and identically distributed random variables, with a distribution function G with support
[c, d]. We assume that buyers valuations and sellers costs are independent of each other
and call the (N +M)-tuple
R(N,M) := (V1, . . . , VN ;C1, . . . , CM)
a realization of the market M := 〈N,M, F,G〉.
This independent private values model has been studied extensively in the literature
on mechanism design and auction theory, see, for example, Myerson [21], Milgrom and
Webber [19], Chatterjee and Samuelson [5], Myerson and Satterthwaite [22], Gresik and
Satterthwaite [10], Williams [27], Baliga and Vohra [1], Muir [20] and Loertscher and
Marx [14]. The results of our analysis immediately generalise to settings in which sellers
produce multiple units (and similarly, buyers demand multiple units), provided the cost
of production for each unit is independently drawn from the distribution G. We may
also relax the assumption of identical distributions. For example, we can suppose a fixed
proportion of sellers draw their costs from some distribution G1 and the rest draw their
costs from some distribution G2, provided we use the appropriate mixture distribution
in our asymptotic analysis. The independent private values model is robust to the in-
troduction of a small amount of dependence among valuations and costs when prices are
bounded in magnitude (see Kosmospoulou and Williams [11]). Thus, theory and results
concerning this model are useful for many practical applications, while results concerning
models with dependent types are considered fragile.
Within a market, the welfare generated by trade is defined as the sum of trading buyer
valuations less the sum of trading seller costs:∑
i∈N
Vi −
∑
j∈M
Cj ,
where N ⊂ {i1, . . . , iN} and M ⊂ {j1, . . . , jN} are, respectively, the subsets of buyers
and sellers who trade in the market. Feasibility requires |N | ≤ |M|. Market welfare can
be thought of as aggregating the gains from trade for all market participants.
A market is said to be efficient if the level of market welfare is always maximised
for given buyer valuations and seller costs. The quantity traded in an efficient market is
called the efficient quantity. To compute it, we form a demand curve by ordering buyer
valuations Vi from highest to lowest: V[1] ≥ · · · ≥ V[N ], and we form a supply curve by
4
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0 1 K N M
V[1]
C(1)
C(M)
V[N ]
Costs & Values
Figure 1: The efficient quantity K is given by the abscissa of the intersection of the plots of
the buyer and seller order statistics, and the respective value of welfare W is equal to the area
of the shaded region.
ordering seller costs Cj from lowest to highest: C(1) ≤ · · · ≤ C(M). The efficient quantity
is then given by
K := argmax
0≤k≤N∧M
k∑
i=1
(V[i] − C(i)) ≡
∣∣{k ∈ {1, . . . , N ∧M} : V[k] − C(k) ≥ 0}∣∣ . (1)
In an efficient market, the value of welfare is given by
W :=
K∑
i=1
(V[i] − C(i)). (2)
Figure 1 provides an illustration for the quantities K and W . Note that it is not nec-
essary to specify a pricing scheme in order to define the efficient quantity and welfare.
However, the efficient outcome can be achieved if the market intermediary sets a price of
max{C(K), V[K+1]} for buyers and min{C(K+1), V[K]} for sellers, where we set V[N+1] = a
and C(M+1) = d for convenience (see Loertscher and Marx [13]). Furthermore, the “match-
ing” of buyers and sellers that appears in (1) and (2) does not necessarily indicate that
these agents trade directly with one another. Indeed, because of the homogeneous goods
assumption, it does not matter which buyer trades with which seller. The “matching” in
(1) and (2) is an algorithm for computing the efficient quantity traded and welfare.
Before stating the main results of this paper, we must introduce some additional
model assumptions. First of all, in our large market setup we will consider a family of
markets of increasing size with the same distribution functions F and G that satisfy the
following standard mechanism design assumption:
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(A1) The distribution functions F and G are absolutely continuous, with respective
densities f(x) and g(x) bounded and bounded away from zero on their respective supports
[a, b] and [c, d], such that (a, b) ∩ (c, d) 6= ∅ (in other words, a < d and c < b).
Given the distribution functions F and G, it is natural and convenient to consider a
net (also known as a Moore–Smith sequence) of markets
Mα := 〈α := (M,N), F, G〉, α ∈ A ,
indexed by the directed set A about which we will make the following assumption:
(A2) We assume that
A := {α = (M,N) ∈ N2 : λα := MN−1 ∈ I},
where I := [1− F (d) + ǫ, 1/(G(a) + ǫ)] for a fixed ǫ > 0.
Here ǫ is assumed to be small enough so that I 6= ∅; note that F (d) > 0 and G(a) < 1
by virtue of the assumption a < d, see (A1). Note also that inf I > 0.
The set A is endowed with the natural preorder: for α = (N,M) and α′ = (N ′,M ′),
one has α ≤ α′ iff N ≤ N ′ andM ≤ M ′.We will be interested in the limiting distributions
of the efficient quantities Kα and welfares Wα for the respective markets from the net
{Mα}αA .
The assumption λα ∈ I from (A2) excludes trivial cases. Indeed, with probability
tending to one, for large α the number of Vi’s exceeding d will be equal to (1 − F (d) +
o(1))N . So if λα < 1 − F (d)− ǫ for a fixed ǫ > 0, it would mean that the total number
of sellers M = λαN would be less than the number of buyers with valuations higher
than the maximum possible production cost d, meaning that all sellers trade and there is
rationing on the demand side of the market. Likewise, the situation when λα > 1/G(a)
corresponds to a market with excess supply (all buyers trade and there is rationing on
the supply side of the market).
To state the main results, we need some further notation. We will frequently deal
with scaled functions of the form h(λ−1α t). For convenience, for any h : [0, 1] → R we
define
ĥ(s) := h(s ∧ 1), s ≥ 0.
Note that the function ĥ(λ−1α t), t ∈ [0, 1], is well-defined for all λα > 0.
6
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0 tα 1
V[1]
C(1)
C(m)
F−1(1− t) G−1(t/λα)
∫ tα
0
Eα(t) dt
V[n]
Costs & Values
Figure 2: The scaled empirical quantile functions, which are associated with demand and
supply, may be approximated by the associated quantile functions. The errors associated with
these approximations are of order 1/
√
N and are given by appropriately scaled Brownian bridges.
Using notation h(−1) for the inverse of function h (to avoid confusion with the recip-
rocal h−1), introduce the functions
Eα(t) := F
(−1) (1− t)− Ĝ(−1)(λ−1α t), t ∈ [0, 1], (3)
and put
H(h) := sup{t ∈ (0, 1) : h(t) ≥ 0} (4)
(which is well-defined for any h : [0, 1]→ R with h(0) > 0) and
tα := H(Eα) ∈ (0, λα ∧ 1), (5)
where the right-hand relation holds due to the assumption on I from (A2).
Due to the a.s. convergence of empirical quantile functions to the theoretical ones, for
large markets the function Eα(t) approximates the difference between the step-functions
whose plots are depicted, respectively, by the dashed and solid lines in Figure 2 (cf. (14)
below). Simulations illustrating this approximation are shown in Figure 3. So tαN
will be the “first order approximation” to Kα, while the integral of Eα over (0, tα) will
specify a deterministic approximation toWα. The “second order approximation” to both
Kα and Wα will be obtained in this paper using the second order approximation to
empirical quantile functions provided by the sum of the theoretical quantile function and
a Brownian bridge process.
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(a) α = (50, 25) (b) α = (200, 100) (c) α = (500, 250)
Figure 3: Three simulations illustrating the approximation of the scaled emirical quan-
tile functions by the theoretical quantile functions when F (x) = x and G(x) = x2 for
x ∈ [0, 1].
Now observe that, provided that f, g are continuous inside their respective supports,
the function Eα(t) is continuously differentiable for t ∈ (0, 1) \ {λα}, and
E ′α(t) = −
1
f(F (−1)(1− t)) −
1
λαg(G(−1)(λ−1α t))
, t ∈ (0, λα ∧ 1). (6)
We will need one more technical assumption on the distribution functions F and G:
(A3) The densities f and g are differentiable on (a, b) and (c, d), respectively. More-
over, the functions
d
dt
1
f(F (−1)(t))
= − f
′(F (−1)(t))
f 3(F (−1)(t))
and
d
dt
1
g(G(−1)(t))
= − g
′(G(−1)(t))
g3(G(−1)(t))
are bounded on (0, 1).
Finally, let
σ2α :=
1
(E ′α(tα))
2
[
tα(1− tα)
f 2(F (−1)(1− tα)) +
tα(1− λ−1α tα)
λ2αg
2(G(−1)(λ−1α tα))
]
, (7)
and
ς2α := 2
∫ tα
0
Sα(t)dt, (8)
where the function Sα(t), t ∈ (0, tα), is given by
1− t
f(F (−1)(1− t))
∫ b
F (−1)(1−t)
(1− F (x))dx+ 1− λ
−1
α t
g(G(−1)(λ−1α t))
∫ G(−1)(λ−1α t)
c
G(x)dx.
Our main result is the following strong approximation theorem. It implies that,
under the above assumptions, the efficient quantity and welfare are asymptotically normal
for large markets. More precisely, the univariate distributions of Kα and Wα can be
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approximated by normal distributions with respective means and variances (Ntα, Nσ
2
α)
and
(
N
∫ tα
0
Eα(t) dt, Nς
2
α
)
. Moreover, the joint distribution of (Kα,Wα) is asymptotically
normal as well. We also give upper bounds for the convergence rates.
Theorem 1. Under assumptions (A1)–(A3), for the net of markets {Mα}α∈A there
exist a net {Rα}α∈A of realizations of these markets on a common probability space
together with a net of bivariate normal random vectors {(Z(1)α , Z(2)α )}α∈A with zero means
and
Var (Z(1)α ) = σ
2
α, Var (Z
(2)
α ) = ς
2
α, Cov (Z
(1)
α , Z
(2)
α ) = κα := −Sα(tα)/E ′(tα),
such that for the efficient quantity Kα one has
lim sup
α
N1/4
(lnN)1/2
∣∣∣∣Kα −NtαN1/2 − Z(1)α
∣∣∣∣ <∞ a.s. (9)
and for welfare Wα one has
lim sup
α
N1/2
lnN
∣∣∣∣ 1N1/2
(
Wα −N
∫ tα
0
Eα(t) dt
)
− Z(2)α
∣∣∣∣ <∞ a.s.
The proof uses the common probability space method and is deferred to Section 3.
The idea is to consider, for a given α = (N,M), the empirical quantile functions associ-
ated with the samples of buyer valuations V1, . . . , VN and seller costs C1, . . . , CM . The
efficient quantity and welfare, defined in (1) and (2) respectively, can then be expressed
as linear functionals of the respective empirical quantile processes. By the results of
Cso¨rgo˝ and Re´ve´sz [6], it is possible to construct a suitable probability space carrying a
sequence of empirical quantile processes that converge almost surely to an appropriately
weighted Brownian bridge process. We use this result to approximate Kα and Wα by
linear functionals of the respective limiting Gaussian process. To complete the proof, we
derive and apply an appropriate generalisation of the delta method and compute bounds
for the approximation rate.
As an illustration to the assertion of the theorem, Figure 4 shows the scatterplot of 104
independent realizations of the centered and scaled (as per the statement of Theorem 1)
random vector (Kα,Wα) in the case when α = (500, 250), F (x) = x and G(x) = x
2 for
x ∈ [0, 1], together with the 0.25, 0.5 and 0.95 ellipsoidal quantiles for the sample. Figure 5
displays these empirical ellipsoidal quantiles together with the respective (theoretical)
ellipsoidal quantiles for the approximating distribution of (Z
(1)
α , Z
(2)
α ). Both plots were
generated using Mathematica 10.
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Figure 4: The scatterplot of simulated 104 independent scaled copies of (Kα,Wα) and its
ellipsoidal quantiles (see the paragraph following Theorem 1 for more detail).
Recall that, for a bivariate distribution P with finite second order moments, the
ellipsoidal quantiles are defined as follows. Let µ and Σ be the mean vector and covariance
matrix of P , respectively. The ellipsoidal quantile of level u ∈ (0, 1) is defined as the
boundary ∂A of the smallest set of the form
A := {y ∈ R2 : (y − µ)Σ(y − µ)T ≤ const}
such that P (A) ≥ u. Empirical ellipsoidal quantiles for a bivariate sample are defined as
the ellipsoidal quantiles of the respective empirical distribution.
Remark 1. Note that N ≍M (N and M are asymptotically equivalent) under assump-
tion (A2), so one could state the assertions of the theorem in a similar way using M
rather than N as well. Note also that κα > 0 (as one would expect, of course) since
Sα(tα) > 0 and E
′
α(tα) < 0.
Remark 2. The true rate of convergence of the distribution of Kα to the normal dis-
tribution is most likely N−1/2, as indicated by the bounds (10) below established in the
special case when F = G. So the crudeness of the bound in (9) seems to be due to the
method of proof employed.
In the interesting special case F = G, the distribution of Kα is independent of F .
Moreover, it is known to be hypergeometric (see the proof of part (ii) below for a more
10
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Figure 5: The empirical ellipsoidal quantiles from Figure 4 together with the ellipsoidal
quantiles of the approximating bivariate normal distribution.
precise statement) and the parameters of the approximating normal law for Kα admit
simple explicit representations as functions of α. In addition, in that case one can establish
a better convergence rate to the normal distribution than that claimed in Theorem 1.
The distribution of Wα (and hence that of (Kα,Wα)) and the approximating normal
law do depend on F . However, one can also obtain simple closed formulae for the param-
eters of the approximating normal laws when the common distribution F = G is uniform
on (a, b). We will only deal here with the case a = 0, b = 1, the results in the general
case following in a straightforward way, and state our results in the form of the following
theorem.
Theorem 2. If F = G then:
(i) one has
tα =
λα
1 + λα
, σ2α =
λ2α
(1 + λα)3
;
(ii) there exist constants C1, C2 ∈ (0,∞) such that
C1
N1/2
≤ sup
x
∣∣∣∣P(Kα −NtασαN1/2 ≤ x
)
− Φ(x)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ C2N1/2 , (10)
where Φ is the standard normal distribution function.
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(iii) If, moreover, F (t) = G(t) = t for t ∈ (0, 1), then∫ tα
0
Eα(t) dt =
λα
2(1 + λα)
, ς2α =
λα(1 + 3λα + λ
2
α)
12(1 + λα)3
, κα =
λ2α
2(1 + λα)3
. (11)
Remark 3. Observe that, in the case from part (iii), the correlation coefficient between
the components of the approximating normal distribution can be easily found to be equal
to
√
3/(λ−1α + 3 + λα). This quantity attains its maximum value
√
3/5 at λα = 1 (that
is, when M = N) and vanishes as λα ∨ λ−1α →∞.
2 Applications and extensions
For ease of exposition, we restricted attention to the efficient mechanism in Section 1.
However, our analysis generalises to a much richer class of mechanisms. Indeed, let B and
S be non-decreasing real functions and consider the transformed sets of buyer valuations
and seller costs given by {B(V1), . . . , B(VN)} and {S(C1), . . . , S(CM)}, respectively. Then
our analysis immediately applies to the mechanism that induces the efficient outcome
with respect to these transformed valuations and costs, provided the assumptions (A1)–
(A3) hold for the composite functions F ◦ B(−1) and G ◦ S(−1). This is illustrated in
Figure 6. Loertscher, Muir and Taylor [17] show that this setup subsumes a large class of
mechanisms, where the functions B and S depend on the objective of the intermediary and
the equilibrium bidding strategies of buyers and sellers. For example, our analysis applies
to profit-maximisation and constrained efficient mechanisms. Specifically, standard (but
fairly involved) mechanism design arguments show that if we set
B(x) = x− 1− F (x)
f(x)
, x ∈ [a, b], and S(y) = y + G(y)
g(y)
, y ∈ [c, d],
then we obtain the profit-maximization mechanism.
For some mechanisms, such as k-double auctions (refer to, for example, Chatterjee
and Samuelson [5] and Satterthwaite and Williams [23]), the strategic behaviour of agents
depends on N and M . More precisely, the strategic behaviour of a given agent refers to
the magnitude of the difference between the private information of that agent and the
information that agent reveals to the intermediary. Our analysis will only apply to such
mechanisms if the strategic behaviour of all buyers and sellers vanishes uniformly on the
support of the respective distribution functions F and G at a rate faster than N−1 lnN
and M−1 lnM , respectively. For example, by the results of Rustichini, Satterthwaite and
Williams [25], the k-double auction satisfies this condition.
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0 1 K N M
V[1]
C(1)
C
S(C)
VB(V )
Costs & Values
Figure 6: Our analysis applies to any mechanism that induces the efficient outcome with
respect to non-decreasing transformations of the empirical quantile functions associated with
buyer valuations and seller costs.
3 Proofs of the main results
The proofs will use the common probability space method and transformed uniform
empirical quantile functions, so we will begin with introducing basic notation and recalling
some key facts.
For a sample X1, . . . , Xn with order statistics X(1) ≤ · · · ≤ X(n), the respective
empirical quantile function Xn(t), t ∈ [0, 1], is defined by
Xn(0) := X(1), Xn(t) := X(i), (i− 1)n−1 < t ≤ in−1, i = 1, . . . , n.
For the empirical quantile function Un(t) constructed from a sample of U(0, 1)-distributed
independent and identically distributed U1, . . . , Un,
Rn(t) :=
√
n (Un(t)− t) , t ∈ [0, 1],
denotes the respective uniform quantile process. Recall that both Un and Rn are random
elements of the Skorokhod space D [0, 1] of ca`dla`g functions on [0, 1].
By the well-known Donsker’s theorem (see, for example, Section 14 of Billingsley [2]),
as n → ∞, the distribution of Rn in D [0, 1] converges weakly to that of the Brownian
bridge process B. A sharp bound on the rate of convergence is given in Cso¨rgo˝ and
Re´ve´sz [6]. A corollary of that result states that there exists a probability space carrying
a sequence of processes R∗n
d
=Rn, n = 1, 2, . . . , and a Brownian bridge process B such
13
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that, as n→∞,
‖R∗n − B‖∞ = O
(
n−1/2 lnn
)
a.s.,
where ‖h‖∞ := supt∈[0,1] |h(t)|, h ∈ D [0, 1].
Therefore, as n→∞,
Un(t) = t+ n
−1/2Rn(t)
d
= t + n−1/2R∗n(t) = t+ n
−1/2B(t) + θn(t)n
−1 lnn (12)
for t ∈ [0, 1], where ‖θn‖∞ = O(1) a.s.
Proof of Theorem 1. It is easy to see from (1), (4) and (5) that
δα := KαN
−1 − tα = H (Eα)−H(Eα), (13)
where
Eα(t) := VN (1− t)− ĈM(λ−1α t), t ∈ [0, 1], (14)
and VN and CM denote the empirical quantile functions for the samples of buyer val-
uations V1, . . . , VN and seller costs C1, . . . , CM , respectively. Now we will analyze the
behavior of δα for “large” α when market realizations Rα are defined using the common
probability space construction (12).
To that end, we will assume that
Vi = Vi,N := F
(−1)
(
UVi,N
)
and Cj = Cj,M := G
(−1)
(
UCj,M
)
, (15)
where
{
UV1,N , . . . , U
V
N,N
}
N≥1
and
{
UC1,M , . . . , U
C
M,M
}
M≥1
are independent triangular arrays
of row-wise independent U(0, 1)-distributed random variables, which are defined on a
common probability space with Brownian bridges BV and BC that are independent of
each other so that, as N,M →∞, for the respective empirical quantile functions one has
UVN(t) = t +N
−1/2BV (t) + θVN(t)N
−1 lnN, t ∈ [0, 1],
UCM(t) = t +M
−1/2BC(t) + θCM (t)M
−1 lnM, t ∈ [0, 1],
(16)
where
∥∥θVN∥∥∞ = O(1) and ∥∥θCM∥∥∞ = O(1) a.s.
In this construction, the empirical quantile functions VN and CM in (14) are those
for the samples in (15), that is they are given by the compositions
VN(t) :=
(
F (−1) ◦ UVN
)
(t) and CM(t) :=
(
G(−1) ◦ UCM
)
(t). (17)
14
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So to analyse the asymptotic distribution of Kα, we will now turn to the asymptotic
behaviour of Eα specified in (14) where the terms on the right-hand side are given by (17).
Using (17), (16) and conditions (A1), (A3) to take Taylor series expansions with two
terms and Lagrange’s form of the remainder gives, after elementary transformations,
VN (1− t) = F (−1)
(
1− t +N−1/2BV (1− t) + θVN (1− t)N−1 lnN
)
= F (−1)(1− t) + N
−1/2BV (1− t) + ϑVN(t)N−1 lnN
f(F (−1)(1− t)) , t ∈ (0, 1), (18)
and, for t ∈ (0, 1 ∧ λα),
CM(λ
−1
α t) = G
(−1)
(
λ−1α t +M
−1/2BC(λ−1α t) + θ
C
M(λ
−1
α t)M
−1 lnM
)
= G(−1)(λ−1α t) +
M−1/2BC(λ−1α t) + ϑ
C
M (t)M
−1 lnM
g(G(−1)(λ−1α t))
, (19)
where
∥∥ϑCM∥∥∞ + ∥∥ϑVN∥∥∞ = O(1) a.s.
Substituting (18) and (19) into the representation for Eα in (14) and using (3) gives
Eα(t) = Eα(t) +N
−1/2Zα(t) + ϕα(t)N
−1 lnN, (20)
where ‖ϕα‖ = O(1) a.s. and
Zα(t) :=
BV (1− t)
f (F (−1) (1− t)) −
B̂C(λ−1α t)
λ
1/2
α g
(
Ĝ(−1) (λ−1α t)
) , t ∈ (0, 1). (21)
One can see from (13) and (20) that if the functionalH were differentiable in a suitable
sense at the “point” Eα, one could derive the desired asymptotic normality of Kα using
a suitable version of the functional delta method (see, for example, Ch. 20 of van der
Vaart [26]). So we will now turn to studying the local properties of H at Eα.
Since f , g and λα are bounded, we see from (6) that
−γ := sup
α∈A
sup
t∈(0,λα∧1)
E ′α(t) < 0.
As Eα(tα) = 0, the above implies that
Eα(t) ≥ γ(tα − t), 0 ≤ t < tα; Eα(t) ≤ γ(tα − t), tα < t ≤ λα ∧ 1.
Hence, for any v ∈ D [0, 1], setting η := ‖v‖∞, one has
inf
0≤t<tα−η/γ
(Eα(tα) + v(t)) > γη/γ − η = 0,
sup
tα+η/γ<t≤λα∧1
(Eα(t) + v(t)) < −γη/γ + η = 0,
15
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1
N
2
N
Kα
N
N−1
N
1
V[i−1],N − C(i−1),M
V[i],N − C(i),M
t
Eα(t)
Figure 7: A graphical illustration of inequalities (23), (24). Recall that KαN
−1 =
H(Eα(t)) = tα + δα.
so that the plot of Eα(tα) + v(t) must “dive” under zero within η/γ of tα:
|H(Eα + v)−H(Eα)| ≡ |H(Eα + v)− tα| ≤ η/γ = ‖v‖∞ /γ.
Thus, the functional H is Lipschitz continuous in the uniform topology at the point Eα.
Using this, (13) and (20), we have
δα = O(N
−1/2) a.s. (22)
Further, since Eα is right continuous, it follows from the definition of H that
Eα(tα + δα) ≤ 0. (23)
On the other hand, using the order statistics V[i−1],N (descending) and C(i),M (ascending)
for our samples (15) (see the definitions just before (1)), we obtain (see Figure 7) for an
illustration of the first inequality)
Eα(tα + δα) ≥ − max
2≤i≤Kα
[(
V[i−1],N − V[i],N
)
+
(
C(i),M − C(i−1),M
)]
≥ − max
2≤i≤N
(
V[i−i],N − V[i],N
)− max
2≤i≤M
(
C(i),M − C(i−1),M
)
. (24)
From a well-known result regarding maximal uniform spacings (see, for example, De-
vroye [9]) and representation (15), we have
max
2≤i≤N
(
V[i−1],N − V[i],N
) ≤ max2≤i≤N
(
UV[i−1],N − UV[i],N
)
mint∈[a,b] f(t)
= O(N−1 lnN) a.s.
Since the second term on the right-hand side of (24) has the same order of magnitude,
(23) and (24) now yield
Eα(tα + δα) = O(N
−1 lnN) a.s.
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Therefore (20) implies that
Eα(tα + δα) +N
−1/2Zα(tα + δα) = O(N
−1 lnN). (25)
Under assumption (A3) we also have
Eα(tα + δα) = Eα(tα) + δαE
′
α(tα) +O(δ
2
α) = δαE
′
α(tα) +O(δ
2
α) a.s. (26)
Combining (25) with (26) and using (22) gives
δαE
′
α(tα) = −N−1/2Zα(tα + δα) +O(N−1 lnN)
= −N−1/2Zα(tα) +N−1/2ψαωZα(δα) +O(N−1 lnN) (27)
with |ψα| ≤ 1, where
ωh(δ) = sup
|t−s|≤δ
|h(t)− h(s)|
denotes the modulus of continuity of the continuous function h on [0, 1]. Recall that, for
a Brownian bridge process B, one has
lim sup
δ↓0
wB(δ)√
2δ ln (1/δ)
= 1 a.s.
(see, for example, Theorem 1.4.1 in Cso¨rgo˝ and Re´ve´sz [8]). As this holds for both BV
and BC , and λα, f and g are bounded away from zero, it follows from (21) that
ωZα(δα) = O(δ
1/2
α ln
1/2(1/δα)) = O
(
N−1/4(lnN)1/2
)
a.s.
Hence (27) now yields
δα = − Zα(tα)
N1/2E ′α(tα)
+O
(
N−3/4(lnN)1/2
)
a.s. (28)
Recall that, for a Brownian bridge process B and any t ∈ (0, 1), B(t) is normally dis-
tributed with respective mean and variance (0, t(1− t)). Since the processes BV and BC
in (21) are independent, we immediately see that Zα(tα) is normally distributed with zero
mean and variance
tα(1− tα)
f 2(F (−1)(1− tα)) +
tα(1− λ−1α tα)
λ2αg
2(G(−1)(λ−1α tα))
.
Setting
Z(1)α := −Zα(tα)/E ′α(tα),
17
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it follows from (7) that Z
(1)
α is normally distributed with respective mean and variance
(0, σ2α). Thus, (28) establishes the first assertion of Theorem 1.
For welfare, from (2), (13) and (14) we have
Wα =
Kα∑
i=1
(
V[i],N − C(i),M
)
= N
∫ Kα/N
0
(
VN(1− t)− CM(λ−1α t)
)
dt = N
∫ Kα/N
0
Eα(t) dt
= N
∫ tα+δα
0
(
Eα(t) +N
−1/2Zα(t) + ϕα(t)N
−1 lnN
)
dt. (29)
Now note that replacing
∫ tα+δα
0
with
∫ tα
0
in the last line will only introduce an error
O(1) a.s. Indeed, since Eα(tα) = 0 and E
′
α(t) is bounded in view of our assumptions
(A1) and (A2) (cf. (6)), one has from (22) that
N
∫ tα+δα
tα
Eα(t) dt = O
(
N
∫ tα+|δα|
tα
(t− tα) dt
)
= O
(
Nδ2α
)
= O(1) a.s.
Further, it is clear from (A1), (A2) and (21) that there exists a constant c < ∞ such
that
max
t∈[0,1]
|Zα(t)| ≤ Y := c
(
max
t∈[0,1]
|BV (t)|+ max
t∈[0,1]
|BC(t)|
)
<∞ a.s.
Hence, again using (22),∣∣∣∣N1/2 ∫ tα+δα
tα
Zα dt
∣∣∣∣ ≤ N1/2|δα|Y = O(1) a.s.
This proves the desired claim since the contribution of the last term in the integrand
in (29) to
∫ tα+δα
tα
will be even smaller in magnitude (recall that ‖ϕα‖∞ = O(1) a.s. and
one has (22)).
Thus we obtain from (29) that
Wα = N
∫ tα
0
Eα(t) dt+N
1/2
∫ tα
0
Zα(t) dt+O(lnN) a.s. (30)
It is clear from (21) that Zα is a zero mean Gaussian process, and so the second integral
on the right-hand side of (30), to be denoted by Z
(2)
α , is zero mean normal as well. For
brevity, set f ∗(t) := f(F (−1)(t)) and g∗(t) := g(G(−1)(t)). Recalling the right relation
in (5) and also that BV and BC are independent Brownian bridges, we compute the
18
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variance of Z
(2)
α as
E
(∫ tα
0
Zα(t) dt
)2
=
∫∫
[0,tα]2
EZα(s)Zα(t) ds dt = 2
∫∫
[0,tα]2∩{s<t}
EZα(s)Zα(t) ds dt
= 2
∫ tα
0
∫ t
0
[
EBV (1− s)BV (1− t)
f ∗(1− s)f ∗(1− t) +
EBC(λ−1α s)B
C(λ−1α t)
λαg∗(λ−1α s)g
∗(λ−1α t)
]
ds dt
= 2
∫ tα
0
∫ t
0
[
s(1− t)
f ∗(1− s)f ∗(1− t) +
s(1− λ−1α t)
λ2αg
∗(λ−1α s)g
∗(λ−1α t)
]
ds dt
= 2
∫ tα
0
[
1− t
f ∗(1− t)
∫ t
0
s ds
f ∗(1− s) +
1− λ−1α t
g∗(λ−1α t)
∫ t
0
s ds
λ2αg
∗(λ−1α s)
]
dt. (31)
Changing variables x := F (−1)(1 − s) and x := G(−1)(λ−1α s), respectively, in the two
integrals inside the square brackets in the last line in (31), we obtain the desired repre-
sentation (8) for ς2α. Now the second assertion of the theorem follows from (30).
To complete the proof of the theorem, it remains to compute the covariance
EZ(1)α Z
(2)
α = −E
Zα(tα)
E ′α(tα)
∫ tα
0
Zα(t) dt = − 1
E ′α(tα)
∫ tα
0
EZα(tα)Zα(t) dt = −Sα(tα)
E ′α(tα)
,
where the last equality follows from evaluation of the inner integral in (31) and the
definition of the function Sα (following (8)). Theorem 1 is proved. 
Remark 4. An argument similar to the second part of our proof of the asymptotic
normality of Kα can be found in the first example in Section 8, Ch. I of Borovkov [3].
However, in our case the quantity tα depends on α and does not converge to any value.
Therefore, the first-order derivative of H cannot be computed by directly applying a
known general version of the delta method, such as the main result in Borovkov [4].
Remark 5. The reader is referred to Cso¨rgo˝ and Re´ve´sz [7] for the minimal boundedness
conditions that must be imposed on f ′ and g′ for (19) and (18) to hold. It turns out that,
for the approximation of Kα, these boundedness conditions may be weakened further as
they are required only in a neighbourhood of tα.
Proof of Theorem 2. (i) When G = F, the equation Eα(tα) = 0 for tα (see (3), (5)) turns
into F (−1)(λ−1α tα) = F
(−1)(1− tα), which means that λ−1α tα = 1− tα, yielding the desired
representation for tα.
Next, in this case for t = tα the value of (6) turns into
E ′α(tα) = −
1
tαf(F (−1)(1− tα)) ,
19
Approximating welfare in large efficient markets
so that (7) becomes
σ2α = t
2
α
[
tα(1− tα) + t2αλ−2α
]
= t2α(1− t2α) =
λ2α
(1 + λα)3
.
(ii) As we already pointed out, in the special case when F = G the exact distribution
of Kα does not depend on F . In fact, as shown in Loertscher, Muir and Taylor [16],
Kα has the hypergeometric distribution Hg(N,M,N + M). It is well known that, as
M +N →∞ and the quantity λα remains bounded away from 0 and 1 (which is ensured
by our assumption (A2)), that distribution can be approximated by a normal distribution
(see, for example, Theorem 2.1 in Lahiri and Chatterjee [12]). The stated bounds (10)
follow from the results established in Theorem 2.2 in Lahiri and Chatterjee [12].
(iii) First note that, in the case of the uniform distributions F = G on (0, 1), one has
F (−1)(t) ≡ G(−1)(t) ≡ t on (0, 1), so that∫ tα
0
Eα(t) dt =
∫ tα
0
(1− t− t/λα) dt =
∫ tα
0
(1− t/tα) dt = tα
2
=
λα
2(1 + λα)
.
Next, since f(t) ≡ g(t) ≡ 1 on (0, 1), we also have
Sα(t) = (1− t)
∫ 1
1−t
(1− x) dx+ (1− λ−1α t)
∫ λ−1α t
0
x dx
=
1
2
t2(1− t) + 1
2
(
t
λα
)2(
1− t
λα
)
, t ∈ (0, tα).
Integrating this expression in t from 0 to tα yields the second formula in (11). To get
the last formula in (11), we just note that Eα(tα)
′ = −1/tα and, as tα/λα = 1 − tα, one
has Sα(tα) =
1
2
t2α(1 − tα) + 12(1 − tα)2tα = 12tα(1 − tα), and so κα = −Sα(tα)/Eα(tα)′ =
1
2
t2α(1− tα). 
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